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Abstract. In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with 
the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental 
Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not 
undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the 
dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the 
dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has 
mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact 
we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text. 
 




Tom Sorell opens his paper, “Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy,” with the 
question: Is experimental philosophy a kind of philosophy? He maintains that it is “at least 
arguable that, despite calling itself ‘philosophy’, experimental philosophy is better classified as 
psychology or some other social science” (1). Sorell then attributes to some experimental 
philosophers the following response to the criticism that experimental philosophy is really 
psychology: 
[Experimental philosophers] claim that certain historical figures who no-one would deny 
are philosophers pursued empirical enquiry, and that experimental philosophy stands in 
the same tradition. … If contemporary academic philosophy is in tension with 
experimental philosophy that is because contemporary academic philosophy has lost 
                                                 
1 To appear in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy. Thanks to Tom Sorell for sharing a pre-print of his 
essay and provoking us to think carefully again about our engagement with the history of philosophy. And thanks to 
Josh Knobe and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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touch with its roots, not because experimental philosophy is actually psychology or some 
other social science in disguise. (1-2) 
 
Sorell identifies our text The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy (Sytsma and 
Livengood, 2016) as one of three sources for this response. But as we will argue, the historical 
response that Sorell attributes to us is not and never has been ours.  
Sorell assumes that our discussion of the historical tradition is a response to a criticism 
and therefore that our discussion aims to justify the claim that experimental philosophy is really 
philosophy. However, he is not very clear about how the criticism is supposed to go. We think 
Sorell is imagining an argument something like this: 
 [A1]  If experimental philosophy uses the methods of psychology, then it is psychology 
           (and not philosophy). 
 [A2]  Experimental philosophy uses the methods of psychology. 
 ------------ 
 [A3]  Experimental philosophy is psychology (and not philosophy). 
Our best guess is that according to Sorell, when experimentalists appeal to the history of 
philosophy, they are responding to something like this argument. As we draw out later, our 
discussion of the history of philosophy is not (and never was) intended to respond to an argument 
that experimental philosophy is psychology. Had we been calling on the history of philosophy in 
order to respond to the objection that experimental philosophy is psychology, we would have 
laid out the objection and our response in Chapter 4 of our book, where we respond to purported 
criticisms of experimental philosophy. Moreover, we would probably not have appealed to the 
history of philosophy in our reply.  
Our first response would likely have been that the argument should be rejected because 
[A1] is false. To see that [A1] is false, consider the following parallel propositions: 
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[A1-a] If logic uses the methods of mathematics, then it is mathematics (and not 
philosophy). 
 
[A1-b] If formal epistemology uses the methods of statistics, then it is statistics (and not 
philosophy). 
 
[A1-c] If philosophy of language uses the methods of linguistics, then it is linguistics 
(and not philosophy). 
  
[A1-d] If interpretive philosophy uses the methods of literary criticism, then it is literary  
  criticism (and not philosophy). 
  
[A1-e] If ethics uses the methods of economics, then it is economics (and not  
 philosophy). 
  
[A1-f] If the history of philosophy uses the methods of history, then it is history (and not 
philosophy). 
 
All of these propositions (and the general principle from which they flow) are false. One might 
try to rescue [A1] by adding a qualifier. For example, one might say that if experimental 
philosophy uses only the methods of psychology, then it is psychology. But then the revised 
version of [A2] needed to secure the target conclusion would be false. We are not sure that there 
are any distinctively philosophical methods, but insofar as there are some, which might include 
developing and reflecting on hypothetical cases, attacking and defending explicitly-articulated 
arguments, analyzing concepts, and raising skeptical challenges, it should be clear that 
experimental philosophy makes extensive use of those methods, as we both illustrate and stress 
in our book (e.g. in Chapter 3, Section 6.1, where we write that “the use of empirical methods 
should be thought of as a way of supporting the philosophical arguments that you give, not as a 
way to avoid giving philosophical arguments”). We could go on exploring alternative 
formulations of the critical argument and showing why they fail. But suffice to say that we see 
no need to appeal to the history of philosophy in order to resist arguments that experimental 
philosophy is psychology and not philosophy. 
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As Sorell conceives the dialectic, experimental philosophers are responding to the 
accusation that experimental philosophy is psychology (and not philosophy). How exactly Sorell 
is imagining the experimentalists’ reply is again somewhat unclear, but here is a way it might go: 
 [E1] Experimental philosophy uses the methods of philosophy. 
 [E2] If [E1], then experimental philosophy is philosophy. 
 ------------- 
 [E3] Experimental philosophy is philosophy. 
The history of philosophy is then brought in to support [E1] in something like the following way: 
 [H1] If experimental methods were used by canonical philosophers, then experimental  
  methods are among the methods of philosophy. 
 [H2] Experimental methods were used by canonical philosophers. 
 -------------- 
 [H3] Experimental methods are among the methods of philosophy. 
 [H4] If [H3], then experimental philosophy uses the methods of philosophy. 
 -------------- 
 [E1] Experimental philosophy uses the methods of philosophy. 
Sorell thinks the historical response faces a dilemma: if experimental philosophy is to maintain 
its “distinctiveness” then it must stress its methods, but its methods are discontinuous with those 
employed by historical figures. We take it that the dilemma has to do with how to understand 
premise [H4]. Sorell seems to think that in order to be plausible, [H4] should say, “Experimental 
philosophy uses the methods of philosophy if the experimental methods distinctive of 
experimental philosophy are among the methods of philosophy.” But amending [H4] in that way 
would make a suitably revised version of [H2] implausible, since the experimental methods 
distinctive of experimental philosophy were not used by canonical philosophers. 
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 We agree that canonical philosophers did not use the methods that Sorell takes to be 
distinctive of experimental philosophy, namely “the application by philosophers of survey 
methods, including the construction of questionnaires, the identification and recruitment of 
research subjects, and the processing of results under constraints of achieving statistical 
significance” (10).2 However, we think that focusing on questions rather than methods is a better 
strategy for demarcating philosophy. Experimental philosophy is philosophy in virtue of its 
practitioners asking and attempting to answer philosophical questions. What unites experimental 
and non-experimental philosophers is the shared targets of their investigations, just as what 
unites biologists (despite a wide diversity of methods employed) is that they are investigating 
questions concerning life and living organisms. To assume otherwise is implausible, for if 
disciplines are demarcated according to their methods, then methodological advances within a 
single discipline are impossible. So-called “biologists” who use methods of DNA sequencing, for 
example, would not actually be biologists, since DNA sequencing methods were not employed 
by biologists prior to the 1970s. Alternatively, if we count researchers using DNA sequencing 
methods as biologists, then criminal pathologists who use DNA sequencing methods to identify 
or rule out suspects would be biologists. Using questions instead gets both cases right: people 
working with DNA sequencing methods to answer questions about life and living organisms as 
such are biologists, and people using those same methods to answer questions about criminal 
behavior are not. 
 In line with our focus on questions, the first section of Chapter 2 of our book 
(“Philosophical Inquiry”) explores some different ways of delineating the targets of 
                                                 
2 We reject Sorell’s description of the methods distinctive of the new experimental philosophy. Experimental 
philosophers have used behavioral experiments, fMRI and reaction time studies, tools of corpus linguistics, and 
structured interviews, among other techniques. Furthermore, not all research in the new experimental philosophy is 
concerned with achieving statistical significance: some is non-inferential and some is Bayesian. 
5 
 
philosophical investigations, asking what might make a question philosophical. For each way of 
characterizing what makes a question philosophical, we indicate how empirical work might be 
useful. We hold that philosophers are people pursuing philosophical projects and that many such 
projects can be advanced by doing empirical work. Those people who conduct empirical work in 
pursuing philosophical projects are experimentalists with respect to method and philosophers 
with respect to their projects. 
In what follows, we further articulate and respond to Sorell’s alleged dilemma. We then 
return to the history of philosophy. 
 
1. No Dilemma 
In Section II of his paper, Sorell distinguishes between empirically informed philosophy and 
experimental philosophy. He offers examples of empirically informed philosophy and then states 
that “these are already familiar specimens of mainstream philosophy, not philosophy requiring a 
manifesto” (10). He continues: 
non-experimental but still empirically informed philosophy… has some of the same 
motivation as experimental philosophy without making any strong claim to be a 
methodologically distinctive kind of philosophy…. But the status of the finished result as 
philosophy seems never to be questioned: experimental philosophy is not in the same 
position. (10) 
 
Sorell considers this to be “a crucial point” (10). The reason appears to be that it is essential to 
casting experimental philosophy as being faced with the dilemma described above: 
Either experimental philosophy is distinctive or it is not. It seems to proclaim and value 
distinctiveness. This distinctiveness seems to consist mainly in the application by 
philosophers of survey methods, including the construction of questionnaires, the 
identification and recruitment of research subjects, and the processing of results under 
constraints of achieving statistical significance. Either it uses these methods and is 
distinctive, in which case its status as philosophy is likely to be questioned, or it is less 




Perhaps Sorell did not mean to be targeting us at this point, but instead aimed only at those 
experimental philosophers who have written or defended manifestos. We think that Sorell is less 
than perfectly clear as to his target in this case. But if Sorell’s barb was supposed to hit us, then it 
was misaimed. After all, we explicitly argue against a conception of experimental philosophy on 
which it would deserve or sustain a manifesto. To emphasize this, we titled the introduction to 
our volume “An Anti-Manifesto”! 
 We open our anti-manifesto by noting that “experimental philosophy is often described as 
a movement, sometimes a revolutionary movement, and [that] the image most often associated 
with it is the burning armchair” (xvii). Against this, we suggest our more expansive 
understanding of the philosophical tradition. We write that “we do not think of the contemporary 
incarnation of experimental philosophy—the new experimental philosophy as we will call it—as 
either breaking with or contemptuous of traditional philosophy” (xviii-xix). Especially in the 
introduction to our book, we appealed to the history of philosophy in order to resist a conception 
of the new experimental philosophy as radically opposed to traditional ways of doing 
philosophy. Such a radical, destructive conception was encouraged by some early proponents of 
the new experimental philosophy. Hence, our primary appeal to the history of philosophy is best 
understood as part of a reply to other experimentalists. In the next section, we will describe our 
purposes in calling on the history of philosophy in more detail. The current point is that for us, 
Sorell’s dilemma is no dilemma at all, since we reject the idea of a manifesto from the start. 
 In the final section of his article Sorell restates the dilemma with our more expansive 
view of experimental philosophy in mind. He argues that such a “lower common denominator 
threatens to undermine the suggestion of a common ambition” (20). Sorell then notes that while 
we embrace a “lower common denominator,” we nonetheless are faced with his dilemma: 
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The problem is that a very inclusive definition of experimental philosophy resulting from 
their ecumenism either makes urgent the question ‘But is it philosophy?’ or else it 
answers that question in the affirmative and experimental philosophy ceases to be 
different in principle from empirically informed or broadly naturalistic philosophy. (20) 
 
But, again, we happily and explicitly embrace the second horn of this (supposed) dilemma. Our 
view is that experimental philosophy is not different in principle from empirical philosophy. 
More carefully, experimental philosophy does not differ in a way that matters for determining 
whether it is or is not philosophy in the contemporary sense of the term. In fact, we explicitly 
make that argument in our book! 
In rejecting what we take to be a fringe view of philosophy on which it is entirely 
independent of empirical facts, we appealed to current philosophical practice, noting that 
“philosophers often make use of empirical findings to advance their philosophical projects.” We 
then quote Sosa (2007, 100) noting that the use of empirical results in philosophy is not novel. 
Sosa suggests that “perhaps the novelty [of experimental philosophy] is rather that experimental 
philosophers do not so much borrow from scientists as they become scientists.” We happily 
accept Sosa’s suggestion, and we remark that this difference would hardly seem to disqualify 
experimental philosophy as philosophy: 
experimental philosophy is thus not too different from what often goes on in the rest of 
philosophy today. And while actually conducting empirical studies is a bit of a departure 
from merely using the empirical findings of others (and harkens back to the experimental 
philosophy of the early modern period), it does not seem like a sufficient departure to 
push experimental philosophy outside the boundaries of philosophy…. (36)  
 
Our view is that experimental philosophy is a subset of empirical philosophy. We hold that there 
is an important practical difference between work in experimental philosophy and the rest of 
empirical philosophy—i.e., that the experimental philosopher is doing empirical work—but we 
doubt that there is an important theoretical difference. 
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 Let us emphasize again: we rejected the claim that philosophy is independent of 
empirical facts by appealing to current philosophical practice, not by appealing to the history of 
philosophy. This is important insofar as the anti-empirical view of philosophy is closer to the 
criticism that experimental philosophy is actually psychology than anything else we have 
discussed. One might imagine a logical positivist such as Ayer claiming that all apparently 
declarative sentences must be either (empty) logical analysis or (substantive) science or plain 
nonsense. Formerly, philosophy included all of these. But now, the plain nonsense is to be 
excised, and the (substantive) science is to be distinguished from philosophy. Hence, philosophy 
just is (empty) logical analysis. Experimental philosophy is not logical analysis, so it is not 
philosophy. But it is not plain nonsense either. So, experimental philosophy must be some 
(substantive) science. Since psychology is similar to experimental philosophy in many respects, 
and since experimental philosophy is some (substantive) science, experimental philosophy must 
be psychology (and not philosophy). Now, we do not formulate this argument explicitly in our 
book, but we do clearly reject the premise that (substantive) science is to be distinguished from 
philosophy. To echo Williamson (2016, 22): “a few diehard Wittgensteinians may still claim that 
no outcome of scientific experimentation is of special relevance to philosophy, whose role they 
confine to dissolving conceptual confusions”, but we believe that “philosophy is a theoretical 
discipline with more constructive ambitions than that.” 
 
2. On Some Uses for History  
We have never appealed to the history of philosophy in order to resist an argument that 
experimental philosophy is really psychology in disguise, but in our book we did make use of the 
history of philosophy in other ways besides resisting the destructive conception of experimental 
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philosophy. Perhaps Sorell’s criticism applies to one of the other ways in which we put the 
history of philosophy to work. In this section, we discuss three ways in which we might be 
thought to have called on the history of philosophy. 
 
2.1 Not a Contradiction in Terms 
The closest that we come to using the history of philosophy in the way that Sorell thinks we do is 
at the beginning of Chapter 1 of our book, where we discuss the history of philosophy in 
challenging the assumption that “experimental philosophy” is a contradiction in terms. The most 
naïve way to frame what we say in the form of an argument is as follows: 
 [B1]  Many philosophers—including canonical philosophers such as Aristotle, Bacon,  
          Descartes, and Leibniz—have at various times used observation and  
          experimentation to answer what they took to be philosophical questions. 
 




 [B3]  “Experimental philosophy” is not a contradiction in terms today. 
 
We expect that Sorell would want to challenge premise [B2], claiming that it begs the question. 
Reflecting on our discussion of Descartes in our anti-manifesto, Sorell accuses us of doing 
essentially this. He writes (7), “The fact that Descartes saw his work in optics as philosophy does 
not establish that philosophy in his sense is the same as philosophy in the sense of most current 
practitioners of the subject.” In terms of the naïve argument, Sorell might be taken to hold that 
what the term “philosophy” means—or alternatively, what counts as a philosophical question—
has shifted enough in the last two hundred years that whereas “experimental philosophy” was not 
a contradiction in terms in the early modern period, it is so today. 
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 We concede that the naïve argument begs the question dialectically against critics of the 
sort that Sorell imagines. The argument is not intrinsically question-begging, since the 
conclusion is not assumed as a premise in the argument. But we expect dialectical opponents to 
reject [B2].3 We also concede that the naïve argument is weak insofar as the truth of [B2] doesn’t 
follow from a simple principle that we accept. For example, one might be tempted to replace 
[B2] with the following principles: 
 [Constancy] For all expressions X, if X was not a contradiction in terms in the past,  
   then X is not a contradiction in terms today. 
 
 [History] If [B1], then “experimental philosophy” was not a contradiction in terms  
   in the past. 
 
Sorell seems to think that we require an assumption such as [Constancy]. However, we agree that 
[Constancy] is false. The meaning of an expression can change over time in such a way that an 
expression becomes a contradiction in terms. 
 In fact, we raise a closely related issue ourselves in Section 2.1.2 (pp. 24-26) of our book. 
Sorell notes that “to their credit, Sytsma and Livengood actually do devote a great deal of 
attention to what is reasonably understood by ‘philosophical question’ in their definition of 
experimental philosophy” (9). What we do in that section is to discuss how “empirical methods 
might possibly be used to advance a philosophical investigation” on a number of different 
accounts of the “sorts of features that might plausibly make an inquiry distinctively 
philosophical” (21).  We survey six types of account, which Sorell briefly summarizes under five 
headings, running the first two accounts together under the label of “the capacity to produce 
wonderment relative to a historical context” (9). While the first account (“The Wonderment 
Account”) build’s off of Plato’s claim that philosophy begins in wonder, the second account 
                                                 
3 See Section 4.2 in Korman (2015) for more on intrinsic and dialectical question-begging. 
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(“The Historical Contingency Account”) is not intended to merely relativize the wonderment 
account. While we introduce this account as a way that one might attempt to remedy the worry 
that “the wonderment account classifies as distinctively philosophical too many questions that 
belong to well-defined disciplines, like physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, which are 
often far removed from contemporary academic philosophy today” (24), we treat it as a free-
standing account.  
 In this context, we raise the issue that “what counts as genuine philosophical inquiry has 
changed over time” (25). While the historical contingency account is given as just one possible 
account of what makes a question distinctively philosophical, we agree with the sentiment that 
what counts as philosophical inquiry has changed over time. We certainly didn’t take ourselves 
to be denying this fact in our brief discussion of Descartes in the introduction to our text. We 
continue: “Through a long process of specialization and professionalization, many interesting 
questions about the world and our place in it have been hived off and assigned to distinct 
disciplines. As a result, academic philosophy today is a narrower field than it once was, and 
philosophers do not typically claim primary ownership of many questions that were once 
distinctively philosophical” (25).  
 But perhaps our discussion of the historical contingency account did not make 
sufficiently clear our recognition of the historical contingency of the domain of the 
philosophical. In laying out these accounts, we did not plunk for one in particular, but simply 
noted that on each account there is room for experimental philosophy. However, we’ve made our 
commitment to some historical contingencies regarding the domain of philosophy abundantly 
clear elsewhere. Here is what we say in another article (Sytsma and Livengood, 2012) in the 
context of a statement from Sir Francis Crick asserting that there is a sharp methodological 
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divide between philosophy and the sciences. After noting that “with the development of 
experimental philosophy over the past decade… an increasing number of philosophers are 
crossing this divide,” we briefly discuss the history:  
Of course, historically speaking, the divide between philosophy and the sciences has not 
always been so sharp as Crick suggests. Not only was it once philosophers who were 
primarily concerned with questions about the nature of matter, for example, but those 
philosophers made significant progress toward answering them. In fact, the first people to 
call themselves experimental philosophers—Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, and some of 
their contemporaries—were working on problems in what we would now call physics or 
chemistry. (2)  
 
And on the next page we continue:  
Looking across the history of philosophy since the early modern period, what we see is a 
process of specialization, with the sciences slowly breaking away from the mother 
discipline of philosophy. And, as this has occurred, philosophy has increasingly become 
focused on theoretical speculation over empirical investigation. In fact, many 
philosophers came to embrace methods that have been thought to be independent of 
empirical investigation, such as conceptual analysis. (3) 
 
We hope that with these remarks in view, Sorell would agree that we have not overlooked the 
historical contingency of the philosophical. 
 Given that we agree that [Constancy] is false, how should one understand our use of the 
history of philosophy in relation to the claim that “experimental philosophy” is not a 
contradiction in terms today? The answer is that for us [B2] expresses (or attempts to express) in 
deductive terms what we take to be an inductive inference. The fact that observation and 
experimentation have been called on by philosophers at many times in history in order to answer 
questions that they took to be philosophical questions gives us some reason to think that we can 
do the same today. And if we can do the same today, then “experimental philosophy” is not 





2.2 Can observation and experimentation help? 
Our use of the history of philosophy in Chapter 1 is obviously intended as a gentle introduction 
aimed to get readers to take seriously the possibility that observation and experimentation are 
useful in philosophical inquiry. For this reason, we conclude our initial discussion of the history 
of philosophy with the following observation: “Philosophers can fruitfully employ empirical 
methods in attempting to answer philosophical questions and solve philosophical problems, and 
they have frequently done so” (5). This suggests the following weaker appeal to the history of 
philosophy: 
 [C1]  Many philosophers—including canonical philosophers such as Aristotle, Bacon,  
          Descartes, and Leibniz—have found observation and experimentation to be 
          useful for answering what they took to be philosophical questions. 
 
 [C2]  If [C1], then it is worth considering whether observation and experimentation might 




 [C3]  It is worth considering whether observation and experimentation might be useful 
          for answering philosophical questions today. 
 
On this framing, our appeal to the history of philosophy is suggestive only. The real work is done 
in Chapters 2 and 3, where we describe ways in which experimentation might help us answer 
philosophical questions and ways in which experimentalists have contributed to contemporary 
philosophical inquiry. Here is how we express this at the start of Chapter 2: 
Some of our readers may be inclined to think that philosophy is, by its very nature, not 
the sort of thing that could be advanced by empirical inquiry, and hence that there could 
never be any reason for a philosopher qua philosopher to engage in empirical work. By 
sketching how experimental philosophy could contribute to philosophy on each of our six 
accounts, we hope to convince neutral readers that there is plenty of room for empirical 
work in contemporary philosophy. (23) 
 
Ultimately, we think it is more helpful to turn Sorell’s problem on its head. The right question to 
ask is not, “Is experimental philosophy really philosophy?” The right question to ask is, “Can 
14 
 
observation and experimentation help us to answer contemporary philosophical questions?” We 
think that the history of philosophy—when viewed in a certain way—can help to motivate the 
question. But the question is not definitively answered one way or the other by appeal to the 
history of philosophy. To be clear, we think that the answer to the question is “yes”: observation 
and experimentation can help us to answer some of our philosophical questions. But that does 
not in any way imply that empirical research is the only way to answer philosophical questions or 
that it will help us to answer every philosophical question. 
 Notice now one further way in which our arguments work. Suppose one accepts that it is 
at least worth considering whether observation and experimentation might be useful for 
answering philosophical questions today. And suppose one is then convinced by our discussion 
of philosophical questions and contributions of experimental philosophers in Chapters 2 and 3 of 
our book. Then it should be obvious that “experimental philosophy” is not a contradiction in 
terms today. 
 
2.3 The “Tradition” as Aberration 
In closing out this section, we want to consider a final way in which we appeal to the history of 
philosophy. We noted in Section 1 that in the introduction to our book we appealed to the history 
of philosophy in resisting the conception of the new experimental philosophy as radically 
opposed to traditional ways of doing philosophy. The new experimental philosophy is often 
described as a revolt against “traditional” philosophy. One imagines a mob of experimentalists 
standing on the barricades, screaming: “Burn the armchairs!” Our goal in calling on the history 
of philosophy was to raise doubts about this conception of experimental philosophy by raising 
doubts about the conception of the philosophical traditional that it is revolting against. Our view 
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is that observation and experimentation are also a part of the philosophical tradition. And we 
called on the example of Descartes to illustrate the point. 
 At the same time, we recognize that philosophy has changed over time. As we note 
above, we acknowledge that over time “philosophy has increasingly become focused on 
theoretical speculation over empirical investigation” (Sytsma and Livengood, 2012, 3). 
Consequently, some have come to think of traditional philosophy as divorced from empirical 
investigation—as an “armchair” discipline. Our goal was simply to indicate that there is more to 
the tradition than this, and that relative to a more expansive view of the tradition, experimental 
philosophy is not revolutionary. 
 Therefore, we prefer to think of the new experimental philosophy as counter-
revolutionary. On our view, the real revolution against traditional philosophy advanced a 
conception of philosophy as an armchair discipline. This revolution—perhaps due to the logical 
positivists, perhaps due to the linguistic turn, or perhaps due to something else—threw away 
empirical methods as irrelevant to philosophy, though as we note in our book, “the use of 
empirical methods in philosophy did not completely disappear” (5). On our view, experimental 
philosophers are aiming to restore those methods to their proper place alongside, but not 
excluding, other methods of philosophy. Hence, the guiding metaphor of our volume was that the 
new experimental philosophy returns a tool to the philosophical toolbox.  
Put another way, we hope that history will come to see the current conception of the 
philosophical tradition as an aberration. In this respect, Sorell is right to say that contemporary 
philosophy prior to the rise of the new experimental philosophy is different from traditional 
philosophy. That fact now does very different work, however. Pre-experimental contemporary 
philosophy diverges from the longer tradition in often conceiving of philosophy as an armchair 
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discipline. But we reject this conception. As we argued earlier in this paper, we think philosophy 
is better demarcated in terms of the questions asked than the methods employed. Many 
philosophical questions can (at least in part) be addressed using empirical methods, and 
experimental philosophers seek to do so. Thus, we urge contemporary philosophers to be more 
like the early moderns and (when appropriate) to call on empirical methods to help answer our 
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